Innovation | An Introduction
Innovation is increasingly seen as the path that can (and must) lead the U.S. towards a more prosperous economic future. At Stanford's 2009 annual Roundtable, hosted by Charlie Rose, Stanford economics Professor Charoline Hoxby stated:``U.S. growth is increasingly dependent on innovation" [58] . Similar sentiment has been articulated from a number of sources: In 2011, a report released by the White House stated that innovation must be a pillar for our economy and stressed the importance of a national innovation strategy [71] . Similarly, in 2011 at a Google Zeitgeist gathering Google Chairman Eric Schmidt said``We need to set out an agenda for innovation for our country as a whole" [14] .
In the book Engines of Innovation it is argued that research universities must step up and play a more central role in tackling``the world's biggest problems" [63] . The core of such innovation often rests on the successful leveraging of computer and information technology within the context of a larger system. We postulate that, in the years to come, semantic computing will provide an essential fulcrum in many such systems. Independent of the underlying technologies employed, the implications of technological dependence are enormous: In their 2010 report, the President's Council of Advisors on Science and Technology (PCAST) stated that Networking and Information Technology (NIT)``underpins our national prosperity, health, and security". It should not be surprising then that the new millennium has seen a distinct shift of academic missions in the direction of interdisciplinary and applied use of computer technology in a shift which is often referred to as translational science.
It is the context of leveraging computer technology to solve``the world's biggest problems" that has led innovators to envision and develop a wide range of highconsequence systems. A classical de¯nition of a high-consequence system is a system in which a high``cost" (or consequence) is associated with failure. Here the cost metric is not limited to the monetary axis, but can range across any axis of social value such as human life, or national security. From this de¯nition, it can be argued that the terms``world's biggest problems" and``high-consequence problems" are practically synonymous. The corollary to this argument is that one can then expect solutions to the world's biggest problems to be realized though innovative highconsequence systems. It is worth noting that these system designs are extremely diverse: they include autonomous decentralized control systems such as the system used to control Japan's bullet train, marine renewable energy systems such as those being developed o® the Florida coast, medical systems permitting the sharing of clinical guidelines and synthesis of clinical work°ows and protocols, supervisory control and acquisition (SCADA) systems such as intelligent water distribution networks, network analysis systems, cloud computing environments, and military systems.
In many high-consequence systems, computer technology (both hardware and software) is increasingly entrusted with critical functionality. This is to be expected since the malleable nature of computer technology makes it well-suited to modeling and enacting complex behavior. In these systems, widely accepted design techniques such as redundancy can be e®ectively used to achieve desired reliability levels in physical components. Unfortunately, no such quanti¯able analogy exists for computer technology. The root cause of this rests on the inability of software based systems to assume failure independence [25] . The notion of failure is further complicated when considerations of security enter into the equation. It is not uncommon for the safety or security of a system to be compromised as a result of human involvement. Such human-in-the-loop failures are generally very di±cult to predict, and their consequences can be greatly ampli¯ed in high-assurance systems. It is precisely the human-in-the-loop dynamic that is addressed by semantic computing, which o®ers the promise of a quantum leap forward in the e®ectiveness of humancomputer interaction.
The story does not end there: casually migrating computerized control and communication into a mature, mechanically controlled system can yield a neẁ`e volved" system whose behavior may in fact be suboptimal when compared to the original. In most cases, headlines are only made when behavior directly gives rise to high-consequence failures. An example of such a headline is the loss of life that occurred as a result of the radiation treatments delivered by the Therac-25 [30] , a computer-controlled medical accelerator. Previous models of the Therac used hardware interlocks to prevent the machine from entering a hazardous state in which fatal doses of radiation could be delivered. In the Therac-25, these hardware interlocks were replaced by software interlocks that, through a design error, could fail as the result of a race condition. In e®ect, the software interlock gave rise to an entirely new failure space, one that had not been accounted for by the previous Therac test suites. Other migration-related failures of high-assurance systems have occurred over the years. Some making major headlines. In 1996, approximately 39 seconds after its launch, the Arianne 5 rocket initiated its self-destruct sequence. At the time, the loss was estimated at $500 million dollars. The failure was ultimately the result of a technology migration. In particular, the inertial guidance system used by the Arianne 5 had been built for the Arianne 4, a less powerful rocket. The error occurred when the inertial guidance system attempted to convert the lateral velocity from a 64-bit value to a 16-bit value. An over°ow occurred which ultimately resulted in the initiation of the self-destruct sequence. Again, as in the case of the Therac, the failure space of the new Arianne 5 rocket had been altered in ways that had gone unnoticed (and were not exposed through tests).
The technology migrations that result when evolving complex high-assurance systems typically entail a wide-spectrum of analysis ranging from the interoperability assumptions underlying individual components to tacit assumptions about secondary properties possessed by system``parts". In some cases, most notably in 3D printing, the tools used to make the parts have themselves undergone profound technology migrations. In the resulting production environments, radically new ways to build parts are possible and the rationale for why a mechanical part has a particular shape (e.g. the full functionality of the part) is often obscured and scattered across legacy documentation. Semantic computing systems, such as the Cyc system [29] , have analysis capabilities well-suited for providing high assurance that technology migrations do not su®er from certain classes of incompatibilities that are unnoticed. Indeed, the importance of such holistic analysis will grow in response to (1) accelerated advance of technology underlying tool evolution, (2) increased complexity of systems built using evolved tools, and (3) increase of software related artifacts yielding large volumes of information. Sifting through such large amounts of interconnected information is precisely the class of problem semantic computing seeks to solve. We posit that the data mining, reasoning systems, and natural language processing capabilities being developed in the semantic computing community will need to be fully utilized in order to provide suitable assurance in the high-consequence systems of tomorrow. As a case in point, the New York Times recently reported [11] that the Thales Group is planing to migrate the mechanical buttons, trackballs, and keypads found in the cockpits of commercial airliners to an iPad-like touch-screen technology.
This article takes a look at high-consequence systems against the backdrop of the challenges and opportunities arising in the 21st century: we explore system designs, their attendant risks, the tools and techniques used to provide assurance in their operation, as well as socioeconomic conditions fostering or inhibiting certain lines of research. Several key architectures for controlling large scale systems are identi¯ed including centralized, decentralized, autonomous-decentralized control, and system-of-systems. Assurance-oriented techniques for understanding and debugging complex system behavior, such as simulation, machine condition monitoring systems, and network vulnerability analysis systems, are also discussed. Modern high-consequence systems increasingly have characteristics requiring their operation in complex environments. Here semantic computing has the potential to play a pivotal role in establishing more accurate as well as time-dependent situational awareness.
This article gives numerous examples highlighting the diversity of the environmental conditions and assumptions that high-consequence systems operate under as well as the threats posed by behavioral models embodying partial understanding of those environments. The evidence presented suggests that the complexity of environments, be they normal, abnormal, or malevolent, present a signi¯cant source of risk. It is argued that the mitigation of these risks must lead to roles of increasing importance for system adaptation, evolution, security measures, as well as human intelligence (supplemented through semantic computing systems) within high-consequence designs. Cross-cutting this discussion, the impact potential of tools, and their evolution, on the design and analysis of systems is touched upon.
Indirection: Leveraging Technology to Create Technology
Since the early twentieth century, visionaries have observed that technological progress is increasing at an accelerating pace. Some have postulated that our society will reach a technological singularity À À À a time when machine intelligence surpasses human intelligence. In 1958, in reference to a conversation with John von Neumann, Stanislaw Ulam wrote:
One conversation centered on the ever accelerating progress of technology and changes in the mode of human life, which gives the appearance of approaching some essential singularity in the history of the race beyond which human a®airs, as we know them, could not continue.
The notion of accelerating change, more speci¯cally exponentially accelerating change, has been embraced by a number of intellectuals over the years. Moore's Law is an instance of this phenomenon focusing on semiconductor circuits.
Recently, the ideas underlying technological singularity have been espoused by Ray Kurzweil. His law of accelerating returns (also known as Kurzweil's Law) centers on the ampli¯cation e®ects of indirection within an evolutionary process.
Evolution works through indirection: evolution created humans, humans created technology, humans are now working with increasingly advanced technology to create new generations of technology. As a result, the rate of progress of an evolutionary process increases exponentially over time. [27] Critics of the idea that technological progress exhibits an overall exponential growth argue that accelerated growth occurs only in speci¯c areas and is predicated on signi¯cant``buy in" (i.e. it must be technologically pro¯table and socially acceptable to advance the technology). In this model, the accelerated advance of technology is ultimately tied to pro¯t and shifting priorities, both of which will likely prevent a society from ever reaching the singularity. In any case, it should be noted that the increased leverage provided though tool evolution is the linchpin of this evolutionary model.
Semantic computing
The¯eld of semantic computing [57] centers on infusing computational systems with human-like intelligence. On a conceptual level, it can be argued that semantic computing represents a direct pursuit of the creation of a machine that can pass the Turing test a . For example, a long-term goal of the Cyc Project [29] is to develop a system having the ability to expand its own knowledge base by``reading" text books and mapping the resulting information to an internal representation which can then be reasoned about by the Cyc engine. A particularly challenging aspect of humanlike reasoning is the fact that humans have a very°exible way of understanding and reasoning about information. They can read imprecise and ambiguous documents and draw sound conclusions from such documents at various levels of abstraction. Furthermore, humans can transition, almost e®ortlessly, from reasoning at one level of abstraction to reasoning at another level of abstraction. To develop such behavioral capabilities semantic computing encompasses a wide spectrum of AI techniques including machine learning as well as logic-based reasoning systems. On a more operational level, the goal of semantic computing is to create machinebased systems having the capability, at some level, to``understand" data and to perform computations based on such understanding. At one end of the spectrum heavyweight e®orts are underway to model, in logic, a basic human understanding of the world. A logic engine provides rules that then lets the resulting system perform reasoning. One such system is Cyc [29] . If completed, a system like Cyc would have an almost human-like intelligence combined with the awesome number-crunching capabilities inherent to machines.
At the other end of the spectrum are lightweight attempts to structure data. To a computer, a document is simply a sequence words and a word is simply a sequence of characters. Additional structure in the form of chapters, sections, paragraphs and sentences might also be modeled in a machine-understandable representation. If modeled, the computing system could be used to answer queries like:``How many chapters does the document contain". However, such structural information is very simplistic and essentially syntactic in nature. Nevertheless, an extension of this concept can be used to infuse a document with semantic information. An example of such a formalism is the Resource Description Framework in attributes (RDFa) [68] which is an XML-based framework in which unstructured text can be decorated with attributes (i.e. tags). These attributes are drawn from widely recognized vocabularies such as the Dublin Core and the social networking Friend-of-a-Friend (FOAF) ontology. The power of structuring data through such mechanisms is that the attributes are``understood" by search engines resulting in more concise (i.e. meaningful) answers to queries. For example, a user may want all articles about Niklaus Wirth, but not written by Niklaus Wirth. Without semantic annotations, a search engine might simply look for the name``Niklaus Wirth" embedded in the unstructured text of documents. Such an approach would fail to make the necessarỳ`b y versus about" distinction. In contrast, minimal semantic structuring of documents would permit search engines to``know" the authors of the documents that are searched. Given the enormity of the data on the web the problem of developing more precise search engines is of growing importance. The Knoesis group estimates that, by 2015, the amount of information on the web will be measured in zeta bytes b .
Regardless of the weight of the semantic system (i.e. heavy, light or something in between), a big challenge is how to create semantic data, which is also referred to as machine-readable data. In the case of RDFa, the developers of web content have the option (but are not required) to include such semantic metadata. In the case of Cyc, semantic data must initially be manually entered into the system. In the case of Cyc this was a massive undertaking requiring 10 person-centuries. For Cyc, the initial basic estimate was that around 1 million semantic concepts would need to be encoded to achieve an understanding of the world comparable to a``basic" human. The number 1 million can be arrived at (i.e. justi¯ed) in a very interesting (and humbling) way. The basic argument is as follows: If a person learns 4 concepts per hour, 24 hours a day, for every day of their life starting at birth and ending at 21 years of age you get around 700 K concepts. Currently, Cyc contains 600,000 concepts using 5 million axioms that have been organized into 6000 microtheories. In the case of Cyc, the hope is that the system will eventually be able to``read" books on b One zeta byte equals 10 21 bytes, which is 1 billion terabytes. its own and automatically increase its knowledge base. Ultimately, semantic computing extends to all forms of data including audio and visual data.
Interoperability
We believe that interoperability, the unconstrained exchange of information between systems, constitutes the core issue confronted by semantic computing. In abstract terms, interoperability challenges arise when the generation of information is decoupled from an open-ended use of that information. Such frameworks require solutions that lie beyond standard data formatting and communication protocols.
It is the decoupling of the production of information from its consumption that gives rise to the need for (1) semantic analysis, whose goal is to convert data into meaning, (2) semantic integration, whose goal is to unify information obtained from disparate sources, and (3) semantic interfaces, whose goal is to provide capabilities suitable for human interaction with information.
An interesting perspective into semantic computing can be obtained by considering two producer-consumer information system types. In the¯rst type of system (H ! C ), humans (H ) are the producers of the information and computers (C ) are the consumers of information. In the second type of system (C ! H ), computers (C ) are the producers of information and humans (H ) are the consumers of information. Semantic analysis techniques such as natural language processing, speech recognition, and processing of multi-modal content can be used to address the challenges surrounding information°ow in an H ! C system. In contrast, retrieval-based semantic analysis techniques as well as visual and natural language interfaces provide the underpinnings of C ! H system types.
A number of semantic computing technologies crosscut both H ! C as well as C ! H systems. These include (1) ontology mapping, (2) ontology integration, and (3) database schema integration.
Data equivalence
In the limit, the goal of semantic computing along the data axis is to create, across all data formats, an equivalence between human-readable data and machine-readable data. In a reality where this goal was achieved, a human and a machine could look at a document (or data source) and obtain a similar and consistent understanding of that document. In this article, we refer to this connection as data equivalence. The implications of data equivalence are truly profound: For example, in a future where data equivalence has been achieved, full interoperability of information systems of Health Care Institutions could be achieved, essentially in an almost implicit fashion. This would open the door to unambiguous standardization of health care and universal sharing of clinical best practices in real-time. The impact on patient safety would be signi¯cant and administrative costs (e.g. paperwork) would be dramatically streamlined.
Data equivalence would also essentially eliminate interoperability challenges present in modern system-of-systems since each system (by de¯nition) could now understand what the other systems were saying (again, this is``in the limit"). All human-in-the-loop systems would experience a dramatic enhancement in the humancomputer interface (what is often referred to as the human experience). Thus, the growing class of cyber-biological high-assurance systems would experience a signi¯-cant advance.
High-Consequence System Designs
Modern high-consequence system designs are becoming increasingly diverse and can be roughly classi¯ed as belonging to one of the following categories.
. Cyber: Systems whose primary behavior occurs in cyberspace. . Cyber-physical: Systems whose primary behavior occurs in the physical world, but whose behavior is controlled and monitored by cyber components. . Cyber-biological: a cyber/cyber-physical system the primary objective of which is to support or otherwise enhance the interaction of an individual or group with a complex dynamically changing environment.
Two key dimensions in system design are the extents to which behavior is distributed and intelligence is partitioned. Behavior distribution poses a number of challenges as well as design opportunities. In particular, how is distributed behavior understood and controlled? Which aspects of control should be localized or globalized?
In general, there are no hard-and-fast rules on how computational intelligence should be partitioned and distributed. The resolution of control challenges can be guided by a variety of control theories than encompass centralized control, and decentralized control. Each approach has its strengths and weaknesses. However, it should be noted that computational intelligence continues to increase and this trajectory will have a profound impact on the design of future systems. In the end, this fundamental characteristic of a system design À À À the relationship between intelligence (e.g. control) and distributed behavior À À À rests on the ability to communicate between the distributed parts of the system.
Semantic computing and the distribution of intelligence
High-consequence systems have safety and reliability requirements (among others) that would be considered extreme when compared to other systems. Such requirements can constrain the role of semantic computing within high-consequence systems. By their very nature, semantic computing systems give rise to feedback loops that exist between humans and machines. As a result of human dynamics, the information in such loops tends to evolve over time. For example, in the medical arena, guidelines de¯ning clinical best practices are, in the long run, continuously improving. Similarly, the understanding of the vulnerabilities of virtually all computer-based systems is also improving through analysis results that are stored in online databases such as BugTraq and CERT.
Both examples mentioned in the previous paragraph de¯ne domains where semantic computing must play a role of critical importance in future systems. Other high-consequence system designs may not be as well suited to enhancement based on semantic computing. Perhaps it would be bene¯cial to revisit such system designs in light of the emerging capabilities of semantic computing.
Centralized control
Examples of systems suitable for centralized control include intelligent water distribution networks, ground transportation systems, and other critical infrastructures such as the electric power grid. The scale and criticality of these systems make them suitable candidates for decentralized control; however, currently operational cyberphysical critical infrastructure systems (at best) utilize distributed implementations of control algorithms that are in essence centralized. Smart (power) grids serve as an example where distributed algorithms such as Max-Flow can be used to generate settings for di®erent physical components [17] . Truly distributed control paradigms such as game theory have been used in experimental work on water distribution, but are yet to be implemented for¯eld use [32] . Impediments to decentralized control of critical infrastructure include issues of jurisdiction and authority, and prevailing reluctance to remove a¯nal human supervisor from the control loop.
Cyber-biological systems
There are two types of cyber-biological systems: (1) human-in-the-loop systems were the computer is in charge most of the time, but the human acts as a check on the computer component and possibly makes¯nal decisions, (e.g. autopilots and°y-bywire systems), and (2) computer-in-the-loop (e.g. surgery apps) where the computer acts as an assistant, enhancer, and advisor but the human is predominantly in charge.
Situational awareness along variables of interest as well as a response capability to environmental conditions are key objectives of cyber-biological systems which enable humans to successfully interact with complex dynamically changing environments. Examples of environments for which these systems are being designed include: automatic air tra±c control (human-in-the-loop), medical treatment (computer-inthe-loop), and war¯ghting.
Today real-time analytics of large data sets is invariably computer-assisted and often includes a``human-in-the-loop". Humans di®er from each other and all have a very limited innate capacity to process new information in real-time. This introduces statistical and systematic uncertainties into observations, analyses and decisions humans make when they are``in the loop". Humans also have unconscious and conscious biases, and these can introduce (major) systematic errors into human assisted or human driven analytics and real-time behavior of critical systems. Realtime issues with human-in-the-loop are discussed in Vouk [66] .
3.2.1.1 Medical systems. The medical arena constitutes what is arguably the area where high-consequence semantic computing will have its greatest societal impact. Aging populations combined with increasingly powerful, diverse, and expensive medical capabilities are creating an enormous strain for all economies that strive to provide comprehensive health care to their populations.
Observations relating to the failure of cyber-biological systems in the medical arena have been made by Cook [12] . A subset of these observations are paraphrased below.
. Single faults generally do not lead to catastrophic failures. . Under normal conditions, system behavior may exhibit a changing number of latent faults, depending on the operational pro¯le. . Humans represent a highly adaptable component within a system, but also they are the source of considerable variability and failure proneness. . System safety is not a component-level property, it is a system-level property. . Humans play a pivotal role in assuring safe system behavior, but also they are the key source of failures of high-assurance systems. . In order to avoid failure one must be able to anticipate (e.g. though experience with) the failure.
In these systems, semantic computing can go a long way towards improving the reliability of human behaviors. Clinical text, such as doctor-patient communications, treatment plans, test results, and other clinical notes provide an enormous opportunity for semantic computing to dramatically improve patient health and safety. A variety of semantic computing-based systems are being developed to enable medical practitioners treat patients more e®ectively. These systems are based on the ability to (1) exchange medical records among doctors and researchers across institutional boundaries for analytical purposes [6] , (2) determine appropriate patient treatment through question/answer systems [53, 65] , and (3) extract and instantiate best practices from clinical guidelines appropriate to speci¯c situations [62] .
Signi¯cant meta-level e®orts are also underway to guide medical research itself. In a recent press release [60] , the EspeRare Foundation of Geneva, Switzerland and the Genetic Alliance of Washington, DC announced an international e®ort to create a semantic computing system called GaugeRx. The purpose of GaugeRx is to assess the potential for drug development in di®erent diseases areas. The goal is to identify the most promising areas of research. Underlying such analysis is an understanding of (1) best practices, (2) current drug development e®orts, and (3) the ecosystem of translation science. When combined the information obtained from these sources constitutes a vast body of knowledge. Supporting this e®ort,``Syapse, the leading clinical omics software company, will provide its semantic computing platform and application suite as the technology solution for data and knowledge management, data mining, and reporting" [60] .
Cyber-physical systems
Traditional infrastructure systems are purely physical in nature, with little communication capability or intelligence. Any control decisions made in such systems, e.g. the water°ow designated for a particular pipe, are typically based on static information from the immediate vicinity of the physical entity being controlled. Control decisions made without consideration of their e®ect on the remainder of the system can have cascading e®ects, and hence adverse consequences, on the operation of the system as a whole, due to the interconnected nature of infrastructure systems. As an example, in a smart grid, the power°ow assigned to a given line may be within the line's capacity, i.e. the control decision made is locally legitimate. However, this control decision may lead to overload of other lines and can cause cascading failures [16] , bringing down the entire system.
Modern critical infrastructure systems are cyber-physical systems (CPS) that utilize intelligent embedded systems, communication capability, and often distributed computing to streamline and fortify their operation [28, 59 ]. An intelligent water distribution network (IWDN) serves as a practical example. Information such as demand patterns, water quantity (°ow and pressure head), and water quality (contaminants and minerals) is critical in providing a dependable supply of potable water, and bene¯cial in guiding maintenance e®orts and identifying vulnerable areas requiring forti¯cation and/or monitoring. Sensors dispersed in the physical infrastructure collect this information, which is fed to the distributed algorithms running on the cyber infrastructure. These algorithms provide decision support to hardware controllers, e.g. valves, that are used to control the quantity and quality (chemical composition) of the water. As IWDNs have become larger and more complex, their dependability has come into question. As an example, vulnerability concerns have been documented for the use of Supervisory Control and Data Acquisition (SCADA) systems for managing IWDNs [13] , which are increasingly replacing operator workstations.
In modern infrastructure systems, the intelligence provided by the cyberinfrastructure facilitates consideration of a larger portion of the system in making control decisions, alleviating the problems caused by localized control. Foremost among these tradeo®s is the added complexity of a CPS as compared to its purely physical counterpart, which creates vulnerabilities that may render the added intelligence ine®ective [49] . Failures (whether accidental or induced) in the hardware or software of the cyberinfrastructure can have far-reaching e®ects, as the same information°ow that provides a global view of the system to local decision support entities can cause errors to propagate. The°ow of``contaminated" information through the system can cause cascading failures [16] .
Specialized models and simulation tools exist for the engineering domains represented in critical infrastructure, including power, water, and transportation. They have been created with the objective of accurately re°ecting the operation of the physical system, at high spatial and temporal resolution. Intelligent control is not captured, leaving them incapable of representing intelligent infrastructure. Ideally, a single model would encompass both the physical and cyber system semantics of an intelligent system in a meaningful way, such that the e®ects of a speci¯c event are re°ected in the reaction of either a cyber or a physical component, or both. Interdependencies among the cyber and physical components, in operation and failure, present a major challenge, as they invalidate simpli¯ed models that assume components fail independently [50, 21, 45] . This hampers study of dependability À À À a particularly urgent task, given the increasing use of cyber control in critical infrastructures.
Decentralized control
Examples of systems suitable for decentralized control include high-speed railway systems, banking systems, robot swarms, and wireless networks. Traditional decentralized systems are composed from uniform components which interact to achieve a global behavior.
Autonomous decentralized systems
Autonomous decentralized systems (ADS) [38, 36, 37] form an important sub-category of decentralized systems having the following properties.
. Autonomous controllability: Any subsystem can, in case of failure of other subsystems, select their control to shift from the given initial value to another given value in¯nite time. . Autonomous coordinability: Any subsystem can, in case of failure of other subsystems, select their control to attain equilibrium of their objectives.
Behavioral properties of living things provide insight into the goals of an ADS design. For example, a living body consists of numerous independent cells that coordinate their behavior to achieve various activities such as maintaining body metabolism.
3.3.1.1 Japan's Shinkansen (high-speed) bullet train. An example of a highly successful ADS is Japan's high-speed bullet train. On Friday, March 11, 2011 a 9.0 magnitude earthquake struck o® the east coast of Honshu 80 miles east of the city of Sendai (about 230 miles northwest of Tokyo). The force of the earthquake and ensuing tsunami had such an intensity that they altered the earth's rotation. The e®ects on Japan were catastrophic. It is estimated that more than 20,000 people lost their lives. Three of Japan's nuclear power plants were severely damaged, and four of Japan's older railways, those closest to the epicenter, were completely washed away. In contrast, Japan's bullet train, which at the time of the quake was in operation and transporting passengers at speeds of 300 km/h, survived the incident without the loss of a single life. Furthermore, the physical infrastructure of the high-speed rail also survived largely intact and the train was in operation within two weeks.
Autonomous decentralized service oriented architectures
Recently, the Services Oriented Architectures (SOA) are being recognized as the key for the integration and interoperability of di®erent applications and systems that operate in an organization. SOA is de¯ned like a business architecture at a logical level, in which the functionality of the application is available to users as shareable and re-usable services on a network of IT. The services of an SOA are the functionality of some application that is exhibited through interfaces and invoked by messages.
In recent years, the necessity to integrate critical applications in an SOA has increased. This is especially true in the¯nancial sector where applications require high availability, as well as consistency and timeliness of information. According to Gartner, SOA will be used between the 50% and 80% of new developments of critical applications in this year. Although they have been accepted, conventional SOA designs have experienced problems relating to availability, performance and°exi-bility. For this reason, new service-oriented models and architectures are being explored.
Autonomous Decentralized Systems were proposed to provide high availability, on-line properties and fault tolerance. They have successfully implemented mission critical applications in industrial,¯nancial and transportation organizations. These properties suggest ADS technology could provide the underpinnings of an SOA. In this context however, it is important to also recognize that the traditional ADS is typically realized using specialized hardware and software. At the Bank of Mexico, research is being conducted on the development of ADS-enabled SOA designs that do not require specialized hardware.
Ensemble systems
More heterogeneously controlled decentralized systems are also possible: At Florida Atlantic University, marine hydrokinetic (MHK) energy systems are being developed to harness the kinetic energy of open ocean currents. In principle, these systems are similar to wind turbines. In the prototype system architecture being developed, an ocean turbine has four controllers, each potentially contending for access to the same actuator banks on the turbine plant. In this system, the intelligence of the control function increases with its distance from the turbine. The controller closest to the plant (i.e. the safety controller) operates on simple scalar data, triggering actuators in response to patently obvious faults. More subtle and subcritical situations are left for controllers located farther from the plant. A topside controller for prognosis and health monitoring (PHM) depends on both a richer set of data (i.e. both time series and scalars), and a wider variety of data (i.e. temperatures, oil particulates and conduction measurements, vibration streams, phasor measurement streams, and meterological data). This segmentation of control follows a brain metaphor by which the controller closest to the plant (i.e. medulla oblongata) handles re°exive actions while the controller farther from the plant (i.e. the frontal cortex) considers longer term actions and consequences.
In this design, the PHM controller employs a variety of fault classi¯ers that have been trained on sensor data using data mining and machine learning techniques. A means of combining the output from these classi¯ers to yield a more reliable and complete view of the system [15] will necessarily entail organizing these classi¯ers into ensembles. By streaming data to the PHM controller, a large pool of classi¯ers can be engaged to predict the operating state of the turbine. Results from a subset of the best performing classi¯ers may be used to formulate directives to the actuator banks. These classi¯ers operate independently and asynchronously, and may recuse themselves from providing a state prediction. These three operational properties require an implementation of a non-blocking form of rendezvous synchronization [55] .
System of systems
In contrast to a monolithic system, a system of systems (SOS) is a highly complex large scale system comprised of operationally independent systems. Maier identi¯es the following key properties as characterizing an SOS [34] .
(1) operational independence of individual systems (2) managerial independence of individual systems (3) evolutionary development of individual systems (4) emergent overall behavior resulting from the behavior of individual systems (5) geographical distribution of individual systems Each element of an SOS may be fully functional systems in their own right and may exist beyond the scope of the SOS. SOS engineering faces challenges fundamentally di®erent from traditional systems engineering [26] . Communication is central to an SOS. In modern systems, this communication is provided by Internetbased networks. This gives rise to a more operational human centered perspective of an SOS involving the ten concepts shown in Fig. 1 . This perspective, which we call i 10 , highlights the key aspects of system coordination and emergent behavior that could occur as a result. In addition to decentralized control, the centrality of human involvement implies this kind of system can also be classi¯ed as a cyber-biological system (e.g. see Sec. 3. 
System Behavior
High-consequence systems (and many other systems) have the property that they should not be debugged``in the¯eld". In cases where our understanding of environments is incomplete, in situ prototypes may need to be developed and tested, as in the case of new systems such as MHK systems. Nevertheless, testing of a physical system is generally not an option for a number of reasons: First, it is not desirable (and may in fact be prohibited) to have an actual system experience a highconsequence failure. Second testing physical systems is generally limited by a number of constraints such as time and wear-and-tear. Physical actions take time to complete and in a well-designed system, the potential for a high-consequence failure is a rare event. It is also problematic to try to accelerate testing for a physical system. Simulation environments could be used, but even then accelerated testing will generally not be su±cient to provide su±cient evidence of high-assurance [8] . This means that a combination of approaches must be used to provide high assurance in system behavior. For example, system designs can be subjected to analysis at various stages in their life cycle. Simulators and other tools such as model checkers can also be used to study and analyze system models at various levels of abstraction. 
System simulation
The construction of the Boeing 777 represented a major milestone the use of advanced techniques in design and development. The 777 is the¯rst commercial aircraft designed entirely in the cyber world. Techniques such as digital product de¯nition and digital preassembly enabled design veri¯cation without the need for physical mockups [19] . Safety analysis also made extensive use of simulation-based data [73] . It should be noted that aerodynamics is a well-understood science, and as a result,°i ght simulators are able to provide a realistic virtual environment in which to test aircraft behavior. However, the construction of accurate simulators in other domains can be much more problematic. For example, realistic simulation of the Internet has proven to be extremely di±cult [44] , especially from the perspective of security-based network analysis.
Modeling and simulation can be used to analyze CPS dependability, as direct observation of critical infrastructure is often infeasible. Accurate representation of a CPS encompasses three aspects: computing, communication, and the physical infrastructure. Fundamental di®erences exist between the attributes of cyber and physical components, signi¯cantly complicating representation of their behavior with a single comprehensive model or simulation tool. Specialized simulation tools exist for the engineering domains represented in critical infrastructure, including power, water, and transportation. These tools have been created with the objective of accurately re°ecting the operation of the physical system, at high spatial and temporal resolution. As is the case with specialized models of physical systems, intelligent control is not re°ected in these tools. Despite the existence of simulation tools for cyber aspects such as computing and communication, di®erences in temporal resolution and data representation and the lack of well-de¯ned interfaces pose considerable challenges to linking these simulation tools in a fashion that accurately represents the CPS as a whole.
One approach to simulation of CPSs is based on the use of existing simulation tools for the cyber and physical networks, respectively [31] . This choice has been justi¯ed by the powerful capabilities of specialized tools in representing their domain (cyber or physical), which allows the focus of the CPS simulator to shift to accurate representation of the interactions between the cyber and physical networks. The proposed solution, where an IWDN is simulated as a case study, utilizes EPANET [64] to simulate the physical infrastructure of the water distribution network and Matlab to simulate the cyberinfrastructure providing decision support. Communication between the two simulators replicates the interactions between cyber and physical components of WDNs, and facilitates the observation of physical manifestations of intelligent control decisions. This communication between the simulators takes place without user intervention, as all information relevant to each simulator has been identi¯ed and extracted from the output of the other. Information°ows from the physical simulator to the cyber simulator, replicating the operation of sensors in the physical infrastructure. The cyber simulator processes this data in Matlab, and provides decision support for water allocation, in the form of setting for control elements in the physical infrastructure. This information is provided to the physical simulator, which applies these settings. This process repeats for the duration of the simulation, as it would in the actual operation of a CPS.
System evolution
An additional challenge faced by a number of systems is that they represent evolutionary changes to systems that are currently in operation. For example, water distribution systems, ground transportation systems, and the power grid all currently exist and are heavily relied upon. In such cases migration to a new system must occur with little to no downtime and must also measure up to the baseline behavior demonstrated by the previous system.
It is worth noting that systems such as those embodying critical infrastructures are generally designed for an operation life-span of inde¯nite length.
For these reasons, e®ective approaches for system design must assume that the system will (1) have faults, (2) undergo maintenance, and (3) evolve over time. Thus, the vision for large systems, such as Japan's bullet train, must span a series of evolutionary changes. It is not possible (or even desirable) to radically evolve the overarching vision of a complex large-scale system on a frequent basis.
Machine condition monitoring and reliability
Many high-consequence systems take the form of a complex set of machines, any one of which might break and trigger a failure. Detecting and mitigating these failures is the job of the machine condition monitoring (MCM) system. This cyber-physical system incorporates both a sensor network to detect the state of the machinery and a computational backend to process this information and produce useful information. MCM systems can provide information at a number of di®erent levels, from the presence or absence of failure to the speci¯c component experiencing failure and even to predictions about when components are likely to fail in the future. This information is invaluable to reducing the costs associated with failures (and with humanintensive monitoring to prevent failures), especially for inaccessible systems such as remote ocean turbines [70] .
Because MCM systems rely on both their sensor networks and their software systems to produce the right conclusions at the right times, it is important to make sure that each of these are suited to the application at hand. Many di®erent sensor types exist, for a variety of di®erent machines and potential failures. Common examples include temperature sensors, pressure sensors, impact sensors, tilt sensors, leak sensors, oil quality sensors, rotation speed sensors (tachometers), and vibration sensors (accelerometers). Each of these must be dealt with appropriately, with details such as update intervals, urgency, and amount of history stored varying between them. Some sensors (such as vibration sensors) even require additional transformation before they can be properly interpreted by the software of the MCM system [69] .
Once the sensors have produced their data to be processed by the computer, the problem of MCM enters the realm of data mining and machine learning (DMML). This is the¯eld concerned with taking raw data (often in the form of instances which contain values for one or more attributes) and building models to form predictions about future data. In the context of MCM, an example of DMML would be taking a dataset with known sensor and system state readings and using this to build a model which can predict the system state using only the sensor values. Unlike a hand-tuned model, this data-driven approach can¯nd connections which may not be obvious to a human practitioner. In addition, new data can be incorporated to update the model. Although for simpler systems MCM can employ human-created models, for more complex high-consequence systems DMML becomes necessary.
System monitoring and security
The assumption that systems have faults and experience run-time failures drives the need to include monitoring and mitigation mechanisms into system designs. These mechanisms can be seen from a system-level perspective as broadening the scope of system control. The assumption that faults may have a malevolent origin (or that innocent faults may end up being exploited by malicious users) drives the need to include security in system designs.
In this context we need to distinguish (1) physical defects or omissions in software and systems-faults, from (2) run-time internal error-states caused by these faults that may not result in visible behavioral system changes, from (3) failures which are visible manifestations of these error states that results in unexpected behaviors of the system at run-time. Secure software is not necessarily reliable or safe, and reliable and safe software is not necessarily secure. While security faults or vulnerabilities and successful security attacks and exploits (or security failures) are in many ways similar to``classical" faults and failures, the presence of deliberate malicious intent tends to modify software use, discovery and repair of vulnerabilities, and attack exploit mitigation in the¯eld.
Security plays an increasingly important role in systems that are placed within an open network (either directly or indirectly). Just as a design goal of an ADS is to design for the ability to°uidly shift control among its subsystems, a similar vision is emerging along a system's security dimension. This security need is perhaps most pronounced for cyber systems in which behavior is achieved in a manner largely unfettered by the limitations of a physical infrastructure.
Currently only about 0.05% to 5% of the total number of software problems reported relate to security, and only about 0.05% to 2% of those result in¯eld failures [2, 1] . Thus,¯eld security failures qualify as rare but high risk events [24] and thus failure intensity decay is open to interpretation, and may be an impractical reliability and security growth guiding and decision tool [51] . Unfortunately, today, typical security vulnerability testing appears to be an ad hoc process À À À an art, with little or no empirical evidence that the approaches used to develop abuse cases, conduct security-focused static analysis, code inspections, or penetration testing are reliable. This domain needs considerable research attention, particularly in the context of high-assurance systems. The key element in this context is continuous monitoring and collection of adequate data, process, environment and actual operational pro¯le provenance information to allow understanding of the problems and pro-active management of the issues.
Recently, semantic computing has made impressive inroads in the area of network security analysis. CycSecure [54] is an extension of the Cyc system to the domain of network risk assessment and monitoring. The system integrates into its knowledge base information from a variety of sources including: online databases where software faults are reported such as BugTraq and CERT, computer speci¯c information obtained from computers on a network, and ontological information about computers and computer networks. A speci¯c network can then be modeled within this framework. After a model has been constructed a thorough and systematic vulnerability analysis can be performed. Such analysis can create, as its result, an attack that exploits one or more faults in the model. When they exist, the CycSecure system can also propose single-step remedies for nullifying a given attack under consideration.
In modern system-of-systems, information°ow forms a critical axis of analysis. Properties of information, such as its integrity, con¯dentiality, and its propagation through the system can have far-reaching consequences with respect to overall system behavior. This impact is more pronounced when system behavior centers around, or otherwise involves, human decision making. In particular, the impact of information on human behavior constitutes a dynamic element of the system that can neither be completely predicted nor fully tested. For example, in command-and-control systems, critical decisions are based on situational awareness obtained though dynamic analysis of information characterizing the complex environment in which the system operates. In an emergency response system, humans may operate physical facilities to achieve overall system tasks and human behaviors directly impact the success of the system mission. In other words, the reliability and security of such systems depends on the reliability and security of the information as well as the human behaviors. As a result, the analysis and assurance of such behaviorally open-ended systems will be much more complex than closed cyber systems. To mitigate the attendant threats of such systems, additional mechanisms are required to monitor the dynamics of the system, such as data provenance techniques to monitor the dynamic information°o w and anomaly detection techniques to monitor human behaviors and detect potential faults, in order to assure the dependability and security of the overall system.
On the Origins of System Failures
In order to design and develop systems for which the strongest possible assurance case can be made, it is important to have a clear understanding of the origin of system failures. Ultimately, one can argue that all system failures can be traced to one of the following sources.
. build the thing wrong -in this case, the requirements of the system are understood, but are not correctly implemented. . build the wrong thing -in this case, a system is developed satisfying an incorrect set of requirements. In practice, the build the wrong thing category is essentially open-ended and incredibly broad.
Regardless of their categorization, all system failures have the property that the operating assumptions made by the system are divergent from the reality of the environment in which the system operates. A system's operating environment can be partitioned into three categories: (1) normal, (2) abnormal, and (3) malevolent.
Normal environments
The normal environment represents environmental conditions under which the system generally (i.e. normally) operates. Stated di®erently, normal environments represent frequently occurring conditions. For this reason, normal environments are extensively analyzed and as a result, fairly well understood À À À at least when compared to abnormal and malevolent environments.
When designing novel systems for use in new environmental frontiers, considerable e®ort should be devoted to understanding environmental conditions. For example, normal environmental challenges for ocean turbines and other remote submersibles include inaccessibility, long duty cycles, and turbulence. Turbulence is especially problematic when remotely monitoring vibrations. Like wind turbines, ocean turbines require optimizing orientation to maximize laminar°ow over the surface of their propellers, reducing vibration and improving reliability. A number of sensor technologies have been developed that are insensitive to turbulent air°ow, enabling measurement of incident wind direction and energetic transformation e±-ciency. One such technology extracts suitable information from the structural deformation of rotating members, where deformation is a function of incident wind direction, velocity and vibration modes [52] .
Abnormal environments
High-consequence systems can experience failures for a number of reasons. Abnormal environments can give rise to conditions exceeding system response capabilities. In addition, our understanding of abnormal environments is generally not nearly as comprehensive as our understanding of normal environments. Consequently, this segregation is re°ected in our system designs.
For example, a solar°are is an abnormal environment that can signi¯cantly impact power grids [4, 40] . In 1989, large solar°are shut down the entire power grid of Quebec in 92 seconds, giving operators virtually no time to react. According to Joseph McClelland, director of the O±ce of Electric Reliability at the Federal Energy Regulatory Commission, in the worst case the impact of a solar storm on the U.S. power grid is dire:
If the solar storm of 1921, which has been termed a one-in-100-year event, were to occur today, well over 300 extra-high-voltage transformers could be damaged or destroyed, thereby interrupting power to 130 million people for a period of years.
In the last three decades of the twentieth century, four abnormal events erroneously triggered the nuclear early warning systems of either the U.S. or Russia [18] . In 1979, in an event now called The Training Tape Incident, a realistic training tape had been inserted into the computer running the nation's early warning system. As a result, three of America's primary military command centers (including NORAD) showed that a massive nuclear strike had been launched by the Soviet Union. The entire continental air defense interceptor force was put on alert and the president's`d oomsday plane" was launched. Escalation to a nuclear war was averted because DSP satellites and radar failed to con¯rm that the Soviet Union had launched missiles. In 1980, in an event referred to as The Computer Chip Incident, the failure of a single computer chip caused our nation's warning system to again show that the Soviet Union had launched a nuclear strike. In this case, monitoring systems displayed inconsistent data and it was quickly determined that the event was a false alarm.
A more serious false alarm occurred in 1983 in an event now referred to as The Autumn Equinox Incident. This time the Soviet Union's Oko early warning satellites triggered a false alarm. In order to avoid misinterpreting natural events (such as light re°ections o® of clouds or snow) as a rocket launch, these satellites circled the earth in what is known as Molnyia orbits. These orbits enabled satellites to view U.S. missile¯elds along the earth's horizon. Unfortunately, a rare alignment between the sun, the satellites, and U.S. missile¯elds resulted in the misinterpretation of sunlight re°ected o® high altitude clouds.
In 1995, an event known as The Norwegian Rocket Incident triggered another false alarm in Russia's early warning system. A scienti¯c rocket used to collect atmospheric conditions was launched from an island o® the coast of Norway. The rocket trajectory was classi¯ed by Russia's early warning system as matching that of a U.S. Trident missile. Within moments President Yeltsin was alerted and his`n uclear football" was activated.
Other high-consequence systems such as marine hydrokinetic (MHK) energy systems being developed at Florida Atlantic University could be threatened by altogether di®erent kinds of environmental conditions such as underwater animal migrations or even suspended garbage. Especially problematic for ocean turbines is fouling due to both natural and human-made processes [56] . The presence of humanmade structures (i.e. ocean turbines) and suspended debris (i.e. plastic bags) provide an ecological niche that attracts fouling organisms. Bacteria, diatoms, spores, and other single-celled organisms initially colonize the surface of a structure forming a slime layer that sets the stage for a form of agglomeration and niche formation (i.e.°o cculation). Left unchecked, this process attracts marine life at successively higher levels on the food web, eventually attracting turtles and cetacean mammals. This process is not uniform À À À less stable portions of a bio¯lm tend to slough o® into°o cs, causing propeller imbalance, unexpected shaft wobble, and wear on rotor bearings.
Malevolent environments
Analysis of system behavior typically assumes abnormal environments are rare and uniformly distributed. In contrast, analysis of malevolent environments is not predicated on uniform distribution. For example, under abnormal environmental conditions it is possible that a web server for a bank may on rare occasions become saturated with external communication requests. However, an analysis based on uniform distribution would conclude that such events would be rare and brief. In a malevolent environment, the orchestration of a sustained°ood of external communication requests is called a denial-of-service attack.
On an international scale, critical infrastructures such as the``smart grid" have seen a sharp rise in cyber-based attacks. Reports have con¯rmed that critical utility systems are continuously probed, up to thousands of times a month. Anecdotal evidence also suggests that a number of these probes have military origins and that nations are conducting cyber-assessments of their adversaries and developing cyberattacks targeting their adversaries' critical infrastructures. The consequences of such attacks can be extremely serious and are being reclassi¯ed as``acts of war" by the Pentagon. A Pentagon o±cial said``If you shut down our power grid, maybe we will put a missile down one of your smokestacks" [47] . China has echoed a similar sentiment and has even made comparisons between cyber war and nuclear war. In a recent essay, two military o±cers from China's PLA c , Senior Colonel Ye Zheng and Zhao Baoxian wrote:
Just as nuclear warfare was the strategic war of the industrial era, cyberwarfare has become the strategic war of the information era, and this has become a form of battle that is massively destructive and concerns the life and death of nations. [7] c People's Liberation Army.
An example of the consequences that weaponized code can have on industrial control systems was demonstrated in June 2010 by Stuxnet, a computer worm that targeted Siemens programmable logic controllers (PLCs). Stuxnet caused extensive damage to¯ve Iranian installations suspected of enriching uranium. Alarmingly, the vulnerabilities that made Stuxnet possible still exist to a large extent. In a recent interview on Wired [74] , Dillon Beresford discussed his research on the vulnerability of programmable logic controllers (PLC's) which are used in SCADA systems throughout the world -the PLC belonging to the Siemens Step7 control system was the target of the Stuxnet worm.
The potential of cyber-attacks is being increased by the fact that networks are becoming more interconnected. Globally, this network convergence is growing by an order of magnitude every three to four years [33] .
The outlook for the private sector is also troublesome. A Gartner report, published in December 2005, estimated that``By 2009, 80% of companies will have su®ered from an application security incident". And, according to a study conducted by the Ponemon Institute, in 2009 the average cost of a data breach for a U.S. company averaged $6.75 million.
Synopsis
The previous sections suggest that incredibly diverse environmental conditions can lead to high-consequence system failures. Given this diversity, it is unrealistic for a system design to assume it has successfully accounted for all possible failure scenarios. A system will encounter unforseen circumstances during its operational lifespan. Therefore, systems must allow for open-ended behavioral responses. At present, this open-ended behavior is best provided by human involvement. Paradoxically then, as high-consequence systems become more complex, the need to retain a human element within the system design increases.
Human control is perhaps most critical to systems where the¯nal control decision involves a set of options all of which have high-consequence outcomes (e.g. prematurely launch a nuclear attack versus delayed response in the presence of an actual nuclear attack). In cases where the consequence of options are more asymmetrical (such as shutting down a nuclear power plant) the system can be programmed with a default response.
Software Faults and Failures
Complex functionality is often realized by software in system designs. Given this role of software, an argument can be made that strong correlation exists between software failures and system failures. Anecdotal evidence also exists suggesting the consequences of software faults are more far-reaching than hardware faults with respect to system failure [9] . Thus, the expenditure of signi¯cant resources in the prevention and mitigation of software faults is justi¯ed.
When conducting analysis into system failures, it is useful to distinguish between the properties of a system's internal and external state. Therefore, we will adopt the following terminology when discussing system failures. De¯nition 1. Failure À À À an (externally) observable system behavior that is in con°ict with the required system behavior.
De¯nition 2. Fault À À À an internal condition which may lead to a system failure.
The understanding of software faults and their relationship to failures in modern systems has been advanced by a recent in-depth analysis of software fault and failure data obtained from a mature NASA mission [22] . The subject software consists of millions of lines of code stored in over 8000¯les. Key¯ndings from this study are summarized below.
. Requirements faults are the source of 33% of failures. . Coding faults are the source of 33% of failures.
. A signi¯cant percentage of failures result from combinations of nonlocalized faults.
The prevalence of coding faults represents a shift in the previously held common wisdom that the overwhelming majority of faults reside in early life cycle artifacts.
Complementing our better understanding of where software faults lie, organizations such as NIST and MITRE have developed code repositories containing known faults [5, 61, 39] . This provides a benchmark by which analysis tools can be compared. In addition, a Static Analysis Tools Exposition (SATE) has been organized in which commercial and academic tools are given the task of¯nding security-relevant defects in source code. The analysis of SATE 2008 suggested that 1=3 to 1=8 of all weaknesses (i.e. faults) are simple, the rest are complicated [41] .
A natural approach to managing faults, especially security faults and failures may be through fault-tolerance. Fault tolerance is a software reliability engineering strategy utilized to achieve a desired level of reliability. With fault tolerance, the system or component is designed to continue normal operation despite the presence of hardware or software faults and run-time failures [35, 67] using strategies such as redundancy and rollback. If we accept that vulnerability-free software-based systems are not a reality we need to engineer the systems so that they can tolerate run-time attacks, error-states and failures. Accepted software fault-tolerance approaches can be divided into: (1) backward recovery, for example using checkpointing, and (2) forward recovery, for example using failure masking through retries and/or functionally equivalent versions. Both need to recognize that a failure or a dangerous state has occurred. This can be done using acceptance testing, external (watchdogtype) consistency checking, or some form of voting. Backward recovery then typically restarts execution from the last saved states. Forward recovery mechanisms on the other hand attempt to dynamically compensate for recognized error-states and failures to keep the execution going without a major externally visible interruption. In the case of security error-states and failures, it may be more di±cult to achieve deterministic recognition of an anomaly and multi-stage fault-tolerance models which use probabilistic error-state recognition methods may need to be developed in order to dynamically avoid new attacks and potential compromises using a combination of normal operational and security attack pro¯le characteristics of a system.
Where the Bugs Lie
In 1906, the Italian economist Vilfredo Pareto observed that 80% of the land in Italy was owned by 20% of the population [43] . Since then similar observations have been made in a variety of disciplines including the¯eld of computer science. This property is often referred to as the 80/20 rule, the Pareto principle, or the law of the vital few.
In software development, the 80/20 rule has been used to characterize a wide range of activities ranging from (1) the e®ort associated with testing software, to (2) the e®ort associated with the implementation of software features. On October 2, 2002 Microsoft CEO Steve Ballmer wrote a 3-page memo which contained the following text:
One really exciting thing we learned is how, among all the software bugs involved in reports, a relatively small proportion causes most of the errors. About 20 percent of the bugs cause 80 percent of all errors, and-this is stunning to me-one percent of bugs cause half of all errors. [3] If the 80/20 rule provided a lens through which to view computer technology in the twentieth century, then perhaps the 99/1 view held by today's Occupy Wall Street movement provides a baseline lens through which high-consequence systems should be viewed in the twenty-¯rst century.
Case-in-point
At the University of Nebraska-Omaha, a Java source-code analysis and migration tool by the name of Monarch is being developed [72] . Resolution is a key function within this tool that has the ability to compute the relation between a reference to a declared entity and its de¯nition. Analysis of Java's Standard Basis libraries reveals that, in¯eld declarations, approximately 99% of references are simple identi¯ers (i.e. identi¯ers containing no``dot" symbols). When viewed from the perspective of the structural properties of good code, such as the Law of Demeter d , the sparse use of`d ot" symbols in identi¯er references is a good thing. However, adherence to such design standards while still permitting complex references (i.e. references containing many dots) has the e®ect of marginalizing this part of the Java programming language.
When taken in its totality, Java's resolution function is extremely complex. However, due to design standards such as the Law of Demeter, this complexity is rarely encountered in practice. It is then perhaps not surprising that rare occurrences have uncovered bugs in Java IDE's and refactoring tools such as Eclipse and IntelliJ [46] . Bugs have even been discovered in the Java compiler itself.
Tools and Control Systems: Complexity and Greater Order
There is a growing need to develop the capacity to construct more sophisticated control systems and to more comprehensively model and analyze them. This need combined with the drive for innovation and entrepreneurship has given rise to the creation of for-pro¯t endeavors whose goals are to develop sophisticated analysis tools that can be e®ectively applied to problems of industrial scale. Successful commercial tools are high-dollar, extremely capable, and represent development e®orts that can be measured in terms of``man centuries". In many cases, the seeds of such technology originated in academic institutions. In today's climate, e®ective technologies are being moved out of academia and into the commercial sector more quickly than ever before.
The rush towards commercialization has created challenges both to industrial advancement and current academic research e®orts À À À both of which are largely incremental. Solving the world's biggest problems will require a continual improvement of infrastructures supporting research. Tools belonging to these infrastructures must be: (1) scalable, and (2) e®ectively reach beyond the footprint of previous (i.e. current) tools. An analysis of this phenomenon from a business perspective can be found in the book The Innovator's Dilemma À À À When New Technologies Cause Great Firms to Fail [10] . In this book the author makes a distinction between advancement along the S-curve of a particular technology, which is incremental in nature, and the transition from the S-curve of one technology onto the S-curve of a new (superior) technology.
Navigating the space of overlapping S-curves is challenging in the current academic climate where the pressure to publish and pursue external funding for projects is occupying a greater share of a researcher's time. ROI's for funded projects are measured in terms of months permitting little time for tool development. State budgets continue to reduce funding to universities and administrators talk of a time in the not-too-distant future when state universities will be almost completely funded by the private sector. This vision is echoed by Thorp and Goldstein who argue that now is the time for our most prestigious institutions (i.e. universities), those``that have received so much over the years," to step up and provide a``return on their investment" [63] .
The resulting landscape is one where researchers must be able to quickly assemble the infrastructure needed to support their research. In the current research climate it is simply``not academically pro¯table" to allocate signi¯cant resources towards tool development. Nowadays the notion of custom tool development from the ground up is almost viewed as quaint. Instead, talk centers around (1) customizing or extending existing tools, and (2) creating tools through the composition of high-level components. While customization, extension, or component-level compositions may yield tools with sophisticated and complex functionalities, these tools also typically have inherent limitations (e.g. they lie on the S-curve of a particular technology). In a similar vein, Kurzweil observes that``complexity" and``order" e are not synonymous:
For example, a new theory that ties together apparently disparate ideas into one broader more coherent theory reduces complexity but nonetheless may increase the``order for a purpose" that I am describing. Indeed, achieving simpler theories is a driving force in science. Evolution has shown, however, that the general trend towards greater order does generally result in greater complexity. [27] 3D printing technology can be seen as a concrete example of how increased order can be achieved via a fundamental shift in underlying manufacturing technology. Speci¯cally, in 3D printing many axes of complexity present in traditional composition-based approaches are entirely eliminated.
Composition-based tools can have limitations that also in°uence research thought processes, oftentimes in profound yet subconscious ways. This phenomenon is wellunderstood and widely accepted in context of programming language design where Edsger Dijkstra said``A programming language is a tool that has profound in°uence on our thinking habits". Therefore, in the context of high-consequence systems and the world's biggest problems, the shackles resulting from the creation of infrastructures not ideally suited to our needs should not be underestimated. Infrastructures will in°uence the direction of research and can impact system reliability in subtle ways.
Unfortunately, in academic circles infrastructure development is oftentimes seen as a behind-the-scenes activity having an engineering-like°avor. A classic example of this mindset existed during the Manhattan Project. Speci¯cally, in the Manhattan project, research into the physics underlying a nuclear weapon was conducted by scientists at Los Alamos National Laboratory. In contrast, design and development of a reliable, safe, and secure nuclear weapon was conducted by engineers at Sandia National Laboratories.
If we are to successfully meet the innovation challenges of the twenty-¯rst century, this mind-set will need to change. Custom infrastructure development must become academically pro¯table.
Infrastructure Supporting Innovation in Software and Control
Infrastructure supporting system design and analysis can pose a serious threat to research in cases where tool development follows a trajectory having a diminishing e Kurzweil de¯nes order as``information that¯ts a purpose". marginal productivity (i.e. development to the right of the in°ection point on the S-curve). In such cases, the root cause of the limitation is oftentimes the nature of the tools themselves, which are constructed from preexisting tools and components. While such constructions generally provide tremendous capabilities, they can have emergent limitations as well, especially at the boundary of technological frontiers. These limitations can impact the reliability of the resulting system in subtle ways.
Haeberlen et al. [20] provide evidence that the evaluation of decentralized systems using inappropriate testbeds and simulators can result in analysis which is inappropriately generalized. In this particular circumstance, the root cause of this problem is that several analysis and simulation tools are considered to be the``gold standard" in this¯eld. Furthermore, the research community is so heavily invested in this technology that conducting analysis based on these tools is deemed necessary for the publication of research¯ndings in top conferences.
The Software Cost Reduction (SCR) toolset is an integrated set of tools whose purpose to is to facilitate the construction of high-assurance speci¯cations [23] . In this toolset, a requirements speci¯cation consists of SCR tables describing a state machine together with properties that the state machine (i.e. system) must satisfy. To assist in the veri¯cation properties, SCR is integrated with third party tools such as the SPIN model checker. To verify an SCR model using SPIN, SCR translates the model into Promela and then invokes the SPIN model checker on the Promela model. The veri¯cation performed by SPIN is complete in a theoretical sense. However, in practice SPIN needs to be properly con¯gured in order to yield an e®ective analysis. An important con¯guration is the designation of deterministic blocks within the target Promela model. In [42] Owen et al. describe an experiment in which an SCR model analyzed by SPIN produced erroneous analysis results. The primary cause of this erroneous analysis was invalid assumptions about deterministic blocks made during the SCR-to-Promela model translation.
Rigdon [48] describes the experiences of Boston Scienti¯c in conducting static analysis of medical device¯rmware. Initially, the intention was to use a commercialo®-the-shelf analysis tool. In an exploratory phase, the company employed an intern to determine how existing static analysis tools might be used for the task at hand. After several months a conclusion was reached that existing tools could not be appropriately con¯gured. A decision was then made to develop a custom domainspeci¯c static analysis tool which would compliment the static analysis capabilities of existing tools. The uncertainty associated with determining the appropriateness of existing tools can be particularly dangerous in a culture where short time frames are combined with inelastic models and analysis goals. In basic research, such problems can be resolved by abstracting away portions of a problem À À À designating these portions to engineering e®orts. Such a strategy is not an option when solving the world's biggest problems.
Conclusion
The socioeconomic conditions of the 21st century virtually guarantee that highassurance systems will play a central role in our future. These systems will be expected to (1) be secure and safe, (2) draw intelligence from a wide range of sources, and (3) operate in highly-complex extremely diverse environments for long periods of time. Under such conditions, assumptions of fault-free operation are not realistic. Systems must be able to adapt to externally as well as internally induced faults. Adaptation principles such as those underlying Autonomous Decentralized Systems as well as the gradated control of ensemble systems are paradigms well-suited to addressing the challenges faced by the emerging class of high-consequence systems. However, due to the diverse and potentially unanticipated nature of fault origins, human intelligence should play a central role at the highest levels of control. Semantic computing o®ers the potential to dramatically enhance the human experience in such systems. In addition to solving key data interoperability problems, data equivalence, the connection between human readability and machine readability, could provide real-time incorporation of vast amounts of knowledge to human-centric decision making processes. This is especially true for medical systems and system-of-systems designs where the notion of``current knowledge" plays an important role.
Across all categories, we see network-based communication playing a fundamental role in future systems. This will give rise to dramatically increased security needs. Semantic computing can (and must) play a pivotal role in meeting such analysis needs. And¯nally, high-assurance in the systems we build will ultimately be provided by the models, simulators, and analysis tools being used to design and develop them. Thus, it will become increasingly important to develop infrastructures most appropriate to the kind of system being constructed, an endeavor which will be especially challenging for one-of-a-kind systems.
In a future where the technological challenges of high-consequence systems have been worked out, the¯nal and most important challenge (the 800 pound gorilla in the room) will be of a philosophical origin:``What policies will these systems of the future be entrusted to enact?" It is here where the technological singularity will be de¯ned.
